This paper combines the imperfect reliability model of Bala and Goyal [2000b] with the heterogeneous player model of Galeotti et al. [2006]. We compare existence, characterization and efficiency results in the resulting framework with the results in other frameworks allowing for imperfect reliability or heterogeneity. Specifically, we compare our work with the framework of Haller and Sarangi [2005] which allows for heterogeneity in link reliability but assumes that players are homogeneous. We find, by contrast with their paper, that non existence of Nash networks is possible in our framework even if the population is very small. Moreover, although the incentives of players to maintain (or delete) links are different, in both frameworks there exist parameters such that every essential network is strict Nash and efficient.
Introduction
In this paper, we introduce both imperfect link reliability and player heterogeneity in the two-way flow version of the connections model explored in Bala and Goyal [2000a] . In the two-way flow version of the model, if player i forms a link with player j, then both players can access each other's information, while the player forming the link incurs the costs. Imperfect link reliability in this context means that links fail to transmit information with some probability. Such a link imperfection describes situations like a phone call where the caller has a positive probability of not reaching the other person and was first proposed by Bala and Goyal [2000b] . Moreover, as in Galeotti et al. [2006] , in our model players are heterogeneous in the sense that the information (or the benefits) that each player i obtains from player j is specific to the identity of both i and j. Player heterogeneity arises naturally in many contexts. For instance, in the context of information networks it is often the case that some individuals are more interested in particular issues (such as computer software) and therefore they are better informed which makes them more valuable as contacts. While our model combines the features of these two models, it is also a counterpart to the model proposed by Haller and Sarangi [2005] where links fail with different probabilities (link heterogeneity) but players are identical in terms of their values and costs of link formation.
The aims of our paper consist in examining the properties of strict Nash networks and efficient networks and comparing them to the strict Nash networks and efficient networks in the other frameworks allowing for imperfect reliability or heterogeneity.
a Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Non-existence of Nash networks appears even if the population is small (3 players) in our model of heterogeneous players and imperfect reliability (pV i,j framework). This result is not valid in the model of homogeneous players and heterogeneous imperfect reliability (p i,j V framework) formulated by Haller and Sarangi [2005] . Then, we demonstrate that while increasing the parameter value associated with the pair (i, j) in the pV i,j framework increases the incentive of player i to form additional links, increasing the value of the corresponding variable in the p i,j V framework has the opposite effect. However, even if the incentives of players to maintain (or delete) links are different in the two frameworks, we show that there exist parameters such that every essential network is strict Nash and there is no conflict between strict Nash and efficient networks. In other words, we find an 'anything goes' result similar to that obtained by Haller and Sarangi in the p i,j V model (Proposition 1 in Haller and Sarangi [2005] ). This result leads us to examine, through a remark, how the restriction of player heterogeneity in a non-trivial way can lead to more predictable patterns of strict Nash networks. We establish that if value heterogeneity is not too high, then a strict Nash network is empty or connected, i.e., the result of Bala and Goyal [2000b] is true when the heterogeneity of players is sufficiently low. It is worth noting that these results are obtained without assuming costs heterogeneity and easily extend to this case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. Section 3 gives the different equilibrium and efficiency results. Section 4 concludes.
Model Setup
In this section we define the formal elements of the strategic form network formation game. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 3, denote the set of players.
Strategies. For player i a pure strategy is a vector
Here g i,j = 1 implies that there exists a direct link, i j, between player i and player j initiated by i, whereas g i,j = 0 means that i does not initiate this link. Regardless of what player i does, player j can always choose a Comparisons with these other models are summarized in the concluding section.
to initiate a link with i or set g j,i = 0. We focus only on pure strategies. The set of all pure strategies of player i is denoted by G i and consists of 2 n−1 elements and the joint strategy space is given by G = G 1 × · · · × G n . Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between G and the set of all directed graphs or networks with vertex set N . Namely, to a strategy profile g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) ∈ G corresponds the graph (N, E(g)) where E(g) is the set of links of g. In sequel, we identify a joint strategy g by its corresponding graph and use the terminology (directed) graph or network g for it.
Graph-theoretic Concepts. A path in g ∈ G from player j to player i = j, is an alternating sequence of distinct players and
We denote by P i,j (k ; g) a path between i and j which goes through the link k in g. The closure g of the network g is defined by ∈ {i s , j}, g k,j = 0. Moreover a star, where g is,j = 1 for all j = i s is a center-sponsored star, and a star where g is,j = 0 for all j = i s , is a periphery-sponsored star. Finally, a star which is neither a center-sponsored star nor a periphery-sponsored star is a mixed star. A network g is connected if there is a path in g between all players i, j ∈ N . A network g is minimally connected if it is connected and for all i j ∈ E(g), g i, j is unconnected. A connected component in a network g is a subset of players N (g) such that if i and j belong to N (g), then there exists a path between them in g while there does not exist any path between i ∈ N (g) and k / ∈ N (g) in g. Finally, a network g ∈ G is essential if g i,j = 1 implies g j,i = 0.
Payoffs. Each player i incurs a cost c > 0 when she initiates the direct link i j, i.e. if g i,j = 1.
b In such a model, a link between players i and j allows for two-way flow of information and therefore the benefits from network g are derived from its closure g ∈ G. We denote by If g i,j = 1, then the link [i j] succeeds (there is direct two-way information flow between i and j) with probability p ∈ (0, 1) and fails (there is no direct information flow between i and j) with probability 1 − p. The success or failure of different links are assumed to be independent. We define a realization of a network g as a network, say g r , such that for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N \{i}, g i,j ≥ g r i,j . Under the hypothesis of independence, the probability of network g r being realized, given g is:
Assuming that players are heterogeneous, player i's benefits from a network g r are given by:
Summing over all possible realizations g r ⊂ g yields expected benefits:
The expected profit function is given by:
II. Payoff in the p i,j V model. The expected payoff function for the heterogeneous links model designed by Haller and Sarangi [2005] is easy to obtain from the previous definitions. Indeed it is sufficient to replace Eq. (1) by:
and equation (2) by
It follows that the expected payoff function given in Haller and Sarangi [2005] is:
Also note that in this model we have
Nash and Efficient Networks. Given a network g ∈ G, let g −i denote the network that remains when all of player i's links have been removed. Clearly, g = g i ⊕ g −i , where the symbol ⊕ indicates that g is composed of the union of links in g i and g −i (similarly the symbol is used to indicate removal of links). A strategy
. . , g n ) is said to be a Nash network if g i ∈ BR i (g −i ) for each i ∈ N . A strict Nash network is a network where all players are playing a strict best response. Note that if g ∈ G is a Nash network, then it must be essential. This follows from the fact that each link is costly while information flow is two-way and independent of which player invests in forming the link.
Efficient Networks. A network g is efficient if the total utility of players is max
- imum, that is W (g) = n i=1 u i (g) ≥ n i=1 u i (g ), for all g ∈ G.
Equilibrium Networks: Existence and Characterization
In this section we present our results concerning the existence of Nash networks and characterization of strict Nash networks in the pV i,j framework and compare these results with those obtained in other papers dealing with the two-way flow model. We first study the difference with regard to the existence of Nash networks in the p i,j V and pV i,j frameworks, when players use pure strategies. Using an example with 83 players Haller and Sarangi [2005] show that if links have different success probabilities, a Nash network may not exist, i.e. link heterogeneity can lead to non-existence of Nash networks in the p i,j V framework.
c We show that the nonexistence result holds in the pV i,j framework even if the size of the population is small while this is not the case in the p i,j V framework. The proof of the first part of the proposition is given in Appendix. The second part of the proposition is shown through the next example. Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of players. Let pV i,j < c for all links i j except the link 1 3. Also, let
(1) The empty network is not a Nash network, since pV 1,3 > c.
(2) A network with one link cannot be a Nash network. Indeed, if it is the link i j = 1 3, then player i can obtain a higher payoff by deleting this link, since pV i,j < c. If it is the link i j = 1 3, then player 2 has a higher payoff if she forms the link 2 1, since pV 2,1 + p 2 V 2,3 > c. (3) Next, a network g with two links cannot be a Nash network. Given that Nash networks must be essential, in such a network there always exists a path in g between the players.
(a) Since pV i,j < c for all links i j, except the link 1 3, no network where a link allows access to resources of only one other player can be Nash (except for the link 1 3). From this it follows that only networks with links {1 3, 2 3}, {1 2, 3 2}, {2 1, 3 1} or {1 3, 2 1} can be Nash. (b) We know that player 2 prefers the link 2 1 to the link 2 3 (since pV 2,1 + p 2 V 2,3 > p 2 V 2,1 + pV 2,3 ). Thus, networks with links 1 3, 2 3, cannot be Nash. (c) We know that ceteris paribus player 1 prefers the link 1 3 to the link 1 2 (since pV 1,3 > c > pV 1,2 ). Thus, network with links 1 2 and 3 2 cannot be Nash.
) > c, the networks with links {2 1, 3 1} or {1 3, 2 1} cannot be Nash. Indeed, in such a case, player 3 has an incentive to set a link with player 2.
It follows that a network with two links cannot be a Nash network. (4) Finally, we show that a network g with three links cannot be a Nash network.
Note that in this network there always exists a path in g between the players.
no network with three links where player 1 or player 2 have formed links can be a Nash network. It follows that no network with three links can be a Nash network.
We now deal with strict Nash and efficient networks in the pV i,j framework and compare the results with those obtained in the other versions of the twoway flow model, in particular the Haller and Sarangi framework. We show that the pV i,j and p i,j V frameworks are quite different with regard to the incentive of a player to form a link. This result is important since the incentive to form links plays a crucial role in determining the architectures of strict Nash networks. However, both models exhibit a key result that is strikingly similar with regard to the characterization of equilibrium networks: there exist parameters such that any essential network is strict Nash. This similarity of results is also found to be true for efficient networks. Let
marginal payoff of player i from adding the link i j in network g in the p i,j V framework when i j / ∈ E(g) and i j succeeds with probability
be the marginal payoff of player i from adding the link i j in network g in the pV i,j framework when the value that player i obtains from j is given by V i ,j and i j / ∈ E(g). In the following proposition we show that increasing the value of the parameter associated with players i and j has an opposite effect in the two models on the incentive of player i to form an additional link.
Proposition 2. Consider two games associated with the p i,j V and the pV i,j frameworks. Let g be a minimally connected network, with i j ∈ E(g) and let there be a path between players i and m through the link
The proof is given in Appendix. This proposition demonstrates that increasing the parameter value associated with the pair (i, j) in the pV i,j framework increases the incentive of player i to form additional links, while increasing the value of the corresponding parameter in the p i,j V framework has the opposite effect. Hence, this proposition highlights a type of complement effect in the pV i,j framework and a type of substitute effect in the p i,j V framework since in this scenario the links i j and i m become more substitutable.
Although the above proposition identifies a complement effect and a substitute effect for a specific link in the two different frameworks, in general it is not possible to compare the incentives for forming just a single link in these two frameworks. Intuitively, we may think that if the parameter associated with the pair (i, j) increases, then the incentive of player i to form the link i j increases to a greater extent in the p i,j V framework than in the pV i,j framework. Indeed in the first model, increasing the variable associated with the pair (i, j) has an effect on the resources obtained by player i from various players. By contrast in the latter framework, increasing the variable associated with the pair (i, j) only has an effect on the resources that player i obtains from player j. We show through an example that this intuition is not true.
To allow for meaningful comparison between both frameworks, in this example, we impose the restriction that p = V , and V i,j = p i,j , for all (i, j) ∈ N × N \{i}, implying that the expected value of a direct link is the same under both formulations, i.e. p i,j V = pV i,j . Obviously, the cost of forming a link is assumed to be identical in both frameworks. Under these conditions, we say that the p i,j V and the pV i,j frameworks are "equivalent". Example 2. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and g be such that g 1,2 = g 2,3 = 1 and g 1,3 = 0. p 1,2 ) ). If the two games are framework equivalent, we have kp = kV and the sign of A − B depends on the value of (1 − p 1,2 p 2,3 ) + p 2,3 (1 − p 1,2 ) relative to the value of 1 − p 2 . It follows that we cannot say if player i has a greater incentive to form a link with player j in the pV i,j or in the p i,j V framework if the value of the variable associated with the couple (i, j) increases.
To sum up the heterogeneous players model of our paper and the heterogeneous links model of Haller and Sarangi [2005] are quite different with regard to the incentive of a player to form a link. Moreover, it is not possible to obtain unequivocal general results with regard to the incentive of players to form additional links in the pV i,j framework from the incentive to form additional links in the p i,j V framework. It follows that there are no simple relation between the set of strict Nash networks in the pV i,j framework and in the p i,j V framework. However, the following proposition shows that the sets of potential strict Nash networks are strikingly similar in the two frameworks. (1) g is a strict Nash network in the corresponding network formation game; (2) g is an efficient network in the corresponding network formation game; (3) g is both a strict Nash and an efficient network in the corresponding network formation game.
The proof of the proposition can be found in the appendix. Here we provide some intuition for this result. Ceteris paribus, the smaller p is, the smaller are the resources obtained from a player through an indirect link compared to a direct link. More precisely, as p decreases, the resources obtained using indirect links become negligible compared to the resources obtained through a direct link. It follows that if p is sufficiently small and the value of pV i,j is sufficiently high relative to c, then player i has always an incentive to form a link with player j even in networks where i already obtains a part of the resources of player j through numerous indirect links. Likewise, if p is sufficiently small and pV i,j is sufficiently small relative to c, then player i never forms the link i j even if player j allows player i to obtain resources of other players through indirect links.
It is worth comparing the result of Proposition 3 with Theorem 1 established by Haller and Sarangi [2005] in the p i,j V framework. It is striking that although the pV i,j and p i,j V frameworks are quite different with regard to the incentive of players to form links, we obtain a similar characterization result: there exist parameters such that any essential network is strict Nash (see Proposition 1 in Haller and Sarangi [2005] ). The intuition behind this similarity is that both models contain parameters which can be adjusted in such a way that the benefit, net of forming links, of unwanted links can disappear while the benefit of wanted links can overcome the cost of linking. However the logic behind these results is quite different. More precisely, since link probabilities vary in the p i,j V framework, it is possible to assign negligible probabilities to unwanted links such that their benefits disappear. In other words, in the p i,j V framework, if we aim at removing a link i j from an equilibrium network, then it is enough to make the variable, p i,j , associated with the two players i and j vanish. By contrast, in our framework it is not sufficient to assign a low value to the variable associated with the two players i and j, V i,j , to remove the link i j from an equilibrium network. Indeed, in the pV i,j framework, player i can have an incentive to maintain her link with player j even if the value V i,j is very low, since the link i j can allow i to obtain the value owned by a player k linked with player j. However, this kind of situations can be avoided if the probability parameter, p, is low enough. To sum up, in the two models if we want to remove a link i j from an equilibrium network, then it is possible to choose parameters in such a way that the values that this link allows player i to obtain directly or indirectly are sufficiently low.
By the way, Proposition 3 allows us to address two issues. The first one concerns the impact of the imperfect link reliability. In the model with heterogeneous players and no link imperfections, Galeotti et al. [2006] find that strict Nash networks are the empty network or the minimal networks in which every non-singleton component is a center-sponsored star. Proposition 3 clearly establishes that the imperfect reliability assumption dramatically increases the size of the set of strict Nash networks. Further, Bala and Goyal [2000b] who allow for imperfect reliability show that strict Nash networks must either be empty, or connected. Not surprisingly the introduction of value heterogeneity dramatically increases the size of the set of strict Nash networks. The second issue addressed by Proposition 3 concerns the coincidence between strict Nash networks and efficient networks. Bala and Goyal [2000b] claim that when costs are very high or very low, relative to the value of players and the probability of link failure, this conflict does not exist. This claim is true for the heterogeneous players model as well. More precisely, it is worth noting that there exist parameters under which there is no conflict between efficiency and equilibrium even if the heterogeneity between players is high. However, it is easy to check that efficient networks and stable networks may not correspond.
Since all essential networks can be strict Nash, Proposition 3 cannot help us to predict which network will arise in equilibrium. This leads to the following question: Can predictable patterns in strict Nash networks and efficient networks be obtained by restricting the heterogeneity in non-trivial ways? In particular, is it possible to find the same kind of results as in the homogeneous case model? The following remark addresses this question. Let us define V M = max (i,j)∈N ×N \{i} {V i,j } and V m = min (i,j)∈N ×N \{i} {V i,j } as the maximum and the minimum values that a player can obtain from another player in the game.
Remark 1. Suppose payoff function satisfies equation (4). If
, then a strict Nash network is either empty, or connected. Here we provide intuition about the role played by population size and value heterogeneity in the above remark. To ensure that a non connected network g is not strict Nash it is sufficient to show that in a situation where a player i has formed a link with some player j and has an incentive to do so, another player k, who does not belong to the same component as j, also has an incentive to form a link with her. We know that in such a situation, if k forms a link with j, then this link will allow her to access the resources of at least one more player than the link i j for player i. Moreover it is clear that the difference of payoff that player i obtains from each player relative to player k is at most V M − V m . Hence, the lower this difference is, the lower is the difference of marginal payoffs obtained by players i and k from establishing a link with j. Finally, player j can be linked with at most n − 3 players in addition to player i. It follows that the smaller the size of the population is, the lower is the difference of marginal payoffs that players i and k obtain from the formation of a link with j. Thus, if heterogeneity, in the sense defined above, is not very high, then the result of the homogeneous case with imperfect reliability still holds, and all strict Nash networks are either empty or connected. In other words, Remark 1 shows that a continuity argument can be used to find the strict Nash architectures in the Bala and Goyal [2000b] pV framework, by using the pV i,j framework. Interestingly enough this type of argument is no longer true with the Galeotti et al. [2006] framework. The following example gives the intuition behind this result.
Example 3. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and g be such that g 1,2 = g 2,3 = g 2,4 = 1 and
Finally we assume that p = 1 − . If is sufficiently small, it is clear that players 1, 2, 3, and 4 have no incentive to form or to delete links. We now show that player 1 has no incentive to replace her link. If player 1 replaces the link 1 2 by the link 1 3, her payoffs will change as follows:
We obtain the same conclusion if she replaces the link 1 2 by the link 1 4. It follows that if > 0 and sufficiently small, then g is strict Nash.
In the absence of link imperfections, that is p = 1 ( = 0), it is obvious that g cannot be a strict Nash network since player 1 obtains the same payoff on replacing the link 1 2 by the link 1 3. This argument plays an essential role in Galeotti et al. [2006] for showing that every non singleton component of a non-empty strict Nash network is a center-sponsored star. However as soon as we introduce link imperfections, that is p = 1, this argument can no longer be used. In other words, the result of Galeotti et al. [2006] cannot be preserved when link imperfections are introduced.
Conclusion
We first summarize the main insights obtained from the introduction of heterogeneity in imperfect reliability models.
(1) Both our model and that of Haller and Sarangi [2005] allow for imperfect reliability and heterogeneity and find similar properties with respect to the set of strict Nash networks. Regarding differences between the two, we find a complement effect in the pV i,j framework and a substitute effect in the p i,j V framework. Moreover, we show that existence of Nash networks in pure strategies is certain with three players in the pV i,j framework while it is not in the p i,j V model. In both situations however, for n > 3 a Nash network in pure strategies may not always exist. (2) Our paper allows for imperfect reliability in the model of Galeotti et al. [2006] .
The primary insight that emerges from this is the fact that the assumption of imperfect reliability dramatically increases the size of the set of strict Nash networks. Moreover, in an almost perfectly reliable world, i.e., when the probability that links fail is small, we do not have the same set of strict Nash networks as in Galeotti et al. [2006] , indicating that p = 1 is a special case. (3) The results about the architectures of strict Nash networks obtained in the model with imperfect reliability and homogeneous parameters is preserved in imperfect reliability models with heterogeneous players when there is just a tiny bit of heterogeneity among the players. This observation shows that Bala and Goyal's characterization results (Bala and Goyal [2000b] ) do carry over to a limited extent in models incorporating heterogeneity.
Finally we believe that another type of link imperfection -decay of information is also worth exploring. Information decay implies that information that comes through longer paths decays and is less valuable (see Bala and Goyal [2000b] , Hojman and Szeidl [2008] , Galeotti et al. [2006] , Jaegher and Kamphorst [2009] ). It would be interesting to compare these two types of link imperfections under heterogeneity to further our understanding of Nash networks.
